Abstract: Many certificateless signature schemes using bilinear pairings have been proposed. But the relative computation cost of the pairing is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group. In order to improve the performance we propose a certificateless signature scheme without bilinear pairings. With the running time being saved greatly, our scheme is more practical than the previous related schemes for practical application.
but they are from bilinear pairings and the pairing is regarded as the most expensive cryptography primitive. The relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher than that of the scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [11] . Therefore, CLS schemes without bilinear pairings would be more appealing in terms of efficiency.
In this paper, we present a CLS scheme without pairings. The scheme rests on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).With the pairing-free realization, the scheme's overhead is lower than that of previous schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] in computation.
Preliminaries
Let the symbol / p E F denote an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field p F , defined by an equation
and with the discriminant 
Let the order of G be n . G is a cyclic additive group under the point addition "+" defined as follows: Let , P Q G ∈ , l be the line containing P and Q (tangent line to / p E F if P = Q ), and R , the third point of intersection of l with / p E F . Let l′ be the line connecting R and O . Then P "+" Q is the point such that l′ intersects / p E F at R and O and P "+" Q. Scalar multiplication over E/Fp can be computed as follows:
( ) tP P P P t times = + + + … (4) .
The following problem defined over G is assumed to be intractable within polynomial time.
Eliptic curve discrete logarithm problem(ECDLP): For * R n x Z ∈ and P the generator of G , given Q x P = ⋅ compute x .
Our scheme

3.1.Scheme Description
A CLS scheme consists of seven algorithms [2] : Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, Sign and Verify. Our scheme also consists of seven algorithms. These algorithms are described as follows.
Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as in put, and returns system parameters and a master key. Given k , KGC does the following. 
Then the correctness of our scheme is proved.
3.2.Security Analysis
In CLS, as defined in [2] , there are two types of adversaries with different capabilities, we assume Type 1 Adversary, A 1 acts as a dishonest user while Type 2 Adversary, A 2 acts as a malicious KGC: Type 1 Adversary: Adversary A 1 does not have access to the master key, but A 1 can replace the public keys of any entity with a value of his choice, since there is no certificate involved in CLS. Type 2 Adversary: Adversary A 2 has access to the master key, but cannot replace any user's public key.
Let A 1 and A 2 be a Type1Adversaryanda Type2Adversary, respectively. We consider two games Game 1 and Game 2 where A 1 and A 2 interact with its challenger in these two games, respectively.
Game 1: This is the game where A 1 interacts with its challenger C:
The challenger C takes a security parameter k and generate master key and params , then sends params to A We prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model which treats 1 H and 2 H as two random oracles [9] using the signature security model defined in [2] . As for the security , the following theorems are provided. 
By , , , 
In these equations, only , , 
Comparison with previous scheme
In this section, we will compare the efficiency of our new scheme with three latest CLS schemes, i.e. Huang et al.'s scheme [8] , Tso et al.'s scheme [9] and Du et al.'s scheme [10] . In the computation efficiency comparison, we obtain the running time for cryptographic operations using MIRACAL [13] , a standard cryptographic library.
The hardware platform is a PIV 3-GHZ processor with 512-MB memory and a Windows XP operation system. For the pairing-based scheme, to achieve the 1024-bit RSA level security, we use the Tate pairing defined over the supersingular elliptic curve 2 3 / : To evaluate the computation efficiency of different schemes, we use the simple method from [15] . For example, the sign algorithm of our scheme requires one ECC-based scale multiplication; thus, the computation time of the sign algorithm is 2.21 × 1 = 2.21 ms; the verify algorithm has to carry out three ECC-based scalar multiplications, and the resulting running time is 2.21 × 3 = 6.63 ms. As another example, in Huang et al.'s scheme [8] , the sign algorithm should carry out a pairing-based scalar multiplications and a map-to-point hash computation; thus, the computation time for a client is 6.38 +3.04= 9.42 ms; the verify algorithm has to carry out three pairing, a map-to-point hash computation , then the resulting running time is 20.04 × 3 + 3.04 = 63.16 ms. Table 2 shows the results of the performance comparison. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient certificateless signature scheme without bilinear pairings. We also prove the security of the scheme under random oracle. Compared with previous scheme, the new scheme reduces both the running time. Therefore, our scheme is more practical than the previous related schemes for practical application.
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